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Abstract
The need to effectively manage IT resources such 
that they enhance the business value of firms makes IT 
governance (ITG) an important issue for both IS 
researchers and practitioners. The purpose of this 
paper is to build a conceptual framework for ITG in 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We first 
analyze the main theories applied in ITG research, and 
confront them with the specificities of SMEs. We then 
highlight the limits of those theories in SMEs context 
and discuss adaptations needed or alternative theories 
in such context. The resulting framework is then 
applied to generate a set of six research propositions 
on ITG in SMEs.
1. Introduction 
Given that some organizations achieve higher 
performance with their IT investments while others fail 
to do so [1], the issue that matters now is to know 
under which conditions organizations create value 
from their IT [2]. It has been argued that IT governance 
(ITG), which “is about controlling the strategic impact 
of IT and its value delivery to the business” [3, p. 543] 
can make the difference [4,5,6]. The need to effectively 
manage IT resources so that they can enhance the 
business value of firms make of ITG an important issue 
and yet an uneasy task [7]. Indeed, the most important 
IT challenges faced by organizations now and in the 
future are less related to technology than to governance 
[5].  
The literature related to ITG in particular, and to 
corporate governance (CG) in general, has mobilized 
and proposed different theories and frameworks to 
explain the mechanisms of governance. However, most 
of those theories and frameworks are often criticized as 
being more appropriate for large enterprises (LEs) and 
less for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
hence the call for revisiting existing theories and 
frameworks or for proposing alternative ones with in 
mind the specific realities of SMEs [8]..SMEs are 
increasingly adopting IT for their strategic activities, 
and ITG can help SMEs make the appropriate IT 
choices to create business value and improve 
performance [6]. Given the important consequences IT 
can have on growth and survival of SMEs in a 
competitive market, we argue that ITG for SMEs is a 
necessity and must be researched 
The purpose of this paper is to build a conceptual 
framework for ITG in SMEs. To do so, we proceed in 
three phases. First, we analyze theories generally 
applied in ITG literature with in mind the specificities 
of SMEs, and we bring out salient limits of these 
theories with regards to the realities of SMEs. Second, 
we identify adaptations necessary to these theories to 
account for the SME’s realities, and alternative 
theories better suited to its context. Third, building on 
the results of the precedent analysis we propose a 
conceptual framework for IT governance in SMEs and 
related propositions that can be used as hypotheses for 
future research. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
In the literature, corporate governance (CG) is 
generally conceptualized with reference to rights and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders in the firm, to 
the relationships among stakeholders with regards to 
the decision-making process, resolution of possible 
conflicts, and control of organizational resources, and 
to the means for setting corporate objectives and 
monitoring performance [9]. The OECD has proposed 
the following definition of CG which seems to have 
gained widespread popularity [10, p. 32]: “a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders [that] 
provides the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined”. 
IT governance has emerged since the 1990s as a
conceptualization of steering the use of IT within a 
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company [3, p. 543]. It is now acknowledged that ITG 
is the responsibility of top management and an integral 
part of corporate governance [11] This view is 
integrated in frameworks such as CoBIT 5 that 
establish good practices for ITG.  Definitions of ITG in
the literature refer implicitly to the principal-agent 
problem which is central in the dominant agency 
theory in CG literature. In this perspective, a parallel is 
made between the alignment of executives’ decisions 
to the owners’ interests in CG and the alignment of IT 
management practices to the firm’s needs in ITG. We 
define ITG as follows: ITG, a responsibility of top- 
management and an integral part of corporate 
governance, encompasses  decision rights and 
accountability framework for encouraging desirable 
behavior in the use of IT, and ensuring that IT goals 
and objectives are realized in an efficient and effective 
manner” (adapted from [11,12]).
2.1. SMEs’ specificity regarding CG and ITG
Early previous studies have pointed out SMEs’ 
specificities [13,14,15]. Blili and Raymond [16] 
grouped these specificities in five categories: 
environmental, organizational, decisional, psycho-
sociological, and informational. Does the specificity of 
SMEs hold in the context of CG and ITG respectively? 
Can a SME embrace CG and ITG mechanisms and 
then keep the distinctive features of SMEs? At first 
sight, CG and ITG would appear counterintuitive for 
SMEs, in such they push for more structuring, 
planning, and formalization. Acknowledging this fact, 
we propose a conceptual framework for ITG 
governance that takes into account the specificities of 
SMEs, showing that there would be ITG mechanisms 
that are compatible with the SME’s nature. In this 
research we use the OECD definition of a SME which 
is any firm that falls under the upper limit of 250 
employees, in both manufacturing and service sectors
[17, p. 17].
2.2. Theories applied in CG and ITG research
Different theories applied into CG research have been 
applied in ITG research as well. The theories discussed 
in this paper results from a literature review conducted 
by the authors. They do not pretend in the 
completeness of the list of existing theories; 
nevertheless, they have tried and are confident that 
they have covered the main and most referred to 
theories. The main theories are agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, power perspective, stewardship 
theory, resource dependency theory, and institutional 
theory [18]. Agency theory is, however, the 
overwhelmingly dominant school of thought both in 
academic research and practice [10].  In the following 
sub-sections we briefly present each theory, succinctly 
analyze its specific application in ITG empirical 
studies, before assessing its level of suitability to 
SMEs’ realities. Alternative theories that are more or 
less applicable to ITG in the context of SMEs are thus 
summarily presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
2.2.1 Agency theory. This theory focuses on problems 
arising from separation of ownership and control [19]. 
The agency theory embraces a narrow, shareholder-
centric view of CG, which reflects the traditional 
finance paradigm of shareholder value maximization as 
the main (if not the sole) goal of corporate 
management [9]. Following agency theory reasoning, 
studies in ITG have analyzed the relationships 
between, on one hand ownership and control structures 
of the firm, and on the other hand the IT performance 
[12,20]. 
Table 1. Theories with lower applicability  
of ITG in SMEs 
Theories
Key issues with 
regard to ITG 
mechanisms
Reasons why lower
applicability  to SMEs
Agency
theory
• Some cases of  
IT outsourcing 
• Principal / Agent 
problems less likely 
[8,21]
• Reference to unlikely 
structures [22]
• Low information 
asymmetry [23]
Stakeholder
theory
• Predominant 
role of owner-
manager
• Suboptimal outcomes 
[8,24]
Power
perspective
• Predominant 
role of owner-
manager
• Lower levels of power 
playing (no entrenched 
groups) [26]
The problem of applying this reasoning in the 
context of SMEs, at least as it has been applied in ITG 
in large enterprises (LEs) is threefold. First, this 
reasoning is based on the principal/agent problems that 
are less likely to happen in SMEs due to the 
overlapping of management and ownership in those 
firms [8,21]; although it could apply in cases such as 
the relationship between an SME and an IT 
outsourcing service provider The second consideration 
that makes the agency theory less appropriate to the 
SME’s context is that structures that are referred to in 
proposed governance mechanisms inadequately mirror 
the ones found in LEs as if SMEs were just scaled 
down LEs [19]. The third consideration is that, due to 
the small size of SMEs, the information asymmetry is 
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very low [23]. Information asymmetry is at the basis of 
opportunistic behaviors that agency theory-related 
governance mechanisms seek to thwart. Therefore we 
consider that agency theory does not apply well to 
SMEs. 
Table 2. Theories with higher applicability of 
ITG in SMEs 
Theories
Key issues with 
regard to ITG 
mechanisms
Reasons why higher 
applicability to SMEs
Stewardship 
theory
• No need for 
agency-based 
control 
mechanisms
• Empowerment of 
owner-managers 
and key 
employees
• Convergence of 
ownership and 
management [21]
Resource 
dependency 
theory
• Role of IT 
external partners
• Role of outside 
and independent 
directors
• Limited internal 
resources [4]
Institutional 
theory
• Institutional 
pressures towards 
ITG mechanisms 
adoption
• Pressures towards IT 
innovations adoption 
from the SME’s 
networks [28,29]
Upper 
echelon 
theory
• IT-related roles 
and 
responsibilities 
for owner-
manager
• IT champion 
among key 
employees
• Predominance of 
owner-managers 
[21,30]
• Important role of 
key employees 
[21,30]
Institutional 
trust theory
 
• Moderating 
effect of 
institutional trust 
(between a SME 
and its external IT 
partner) on the 
adoption of ITG 
mechanisms.
• Partnership based on 
trust [4]
• Limited resources for 
agency-based controls 
implementation [31].
2.2.2 Stakeholder theory. While agency theory 
focuses on the sole dual relationship between managers 
and shareholders, the stakeholder theory broadens 
constituencies, adding to managers and shareholders 
other groups of actors that may have a direct or indirect 
stake at the firm’s operations [32,33]. Stakeholder 
theory is inherently inscribed into ITG: many ITG 
definitions “explicitly or implicitly refer to 
stakeholders either as ends of or as contributors to the 
ITG activities” [34, p. 981] [35,36]. The stakeholder 
theory has been criticized as a perspective that can lead 
SMEs to implement policies with sub-optimal 
outcomes [24,25]. The pursuit of divergent 
stakeholders’ interests such as environmental versus 
financial is less of an issue in SMEs than in LEs. As a 
̌definitive stakeholder̍, the SME owner-manager is 
the most salient among all stakeholders, that is, the one 
whose claims will be given priority in ITG [37, p. 873]. 
Therefore the stakeholder theory does not apply so 
well to the reality of SMEs with regards to ITG. 
2.2.3 Power perspective. The power perspective is 
used in corporate governance to analyze potential 
conflicts of interests that may arise among different 
stakeholders, notably among executives, directors, and 
shareholders [43]. With regard to ITG, the power 
perspective is referred to analyze the relative influence 
of IT function comparatively to the influence of other 
business units in IT-related decision processes [42, 44]. 
The potential conflicts opposing executives, directors, 
and shareholders that are at the core of the power 
perspective theory [45] are less likely to be observed in 
SMEs. Thus, this theory does not capture well the 
reality of SMEs with regards to ITG.  
2.2.4 Stewardship theory. This theory is based on an 
assumption opposite to the agency theory’s premise of 
opportunistic behavior as inherent to human nature. 
According to the stewardship theory, managers are 
naturally trustworthy, and seek to be good stewards of 
the corporate assets [19,38,39]. With regard to ITG 
specifically, McGinnis et al. [40] argue that 
stewardship theory may be more consistent with the 
nature of ITG, even more than the agency theory is. 
The stewardship theory fits very well in the context of 
SMEs. Indeed, due to overlapping of ownership and 
control in most SMEs, managers’ interests are 
perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests [21].  
2.2.5 Resource dependency theory. This theory is 
used in CG to explain the role of board of directors as a 
link to access to further resources available in the 
firm’s environment [38]. The resource-dependency 
theory can be and has been specifically applied to ITG 
[41,42]. The resource-dependency theory fits well to 
the context of SMEs, particularly because most SMEs 
depend on external IT expertise [4]. 
2.2.6 Institutional theory. This theory considers that 
organizations are not just economic systems motivated 
by the pursuit of economic efficiency and performance, 
but are also social and cultural systems that seek to 
gain legitimacy in their environment by adjusting 
themselves to regulations, norms and values [18,46]. 
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Institutional theory acknowledges the influence of an 
organization’s environment on its IT structures and 
practices. More precisely, the intensity of institutional 
pressures will affect the IT department power, and will 
influence an organization’s ITG patterns [42]. 
Moreover, due to their size and to their limited 
resources, SMEs may be more influenced by their 
environment than LEs. Hence the suitability of 
institutional theory application for analyzing the 
adoption of ITG practices in the SME’s context 
[28,29,47,48]. 
Among alternative theories that can be mobilized to 
study ITG in SMEs, and that are more appropriate ones 
are upper echelon theory [21] and institutional trust 
theory [4].  
2.2.7 Upper echelon theory. According to upper 
echelon theory, the characteristics of top-level 
managers play a crucial role in determining strategic 
organizational outcomes and processes [27]. The small 
size and the structural flexibility of SMEs intensify the 
involvement of top managers in almost all of the firm’s
activities, and their influence is thus stronger than it 
can be in LEs [21].  
2.2.8. Institutional trust theory. This theory is an 
interesting alternative theoretical perspective to agency 
theory and it is suitable to the context of SMEs as well. 
Instead of relying on agency-based control 
mechanisms to deter opportunistic behavior in IT 
collaboration relationships, SMEs may develop a 
partnership based on trust [4, p. 210]. Trust reduces the 
need to resort to structured controls or to 
comprehensive outcome-based contracts, for which 
SMEs may not be well-equipped to deal with [31]. 
From the upper echelon theoretical perspective, any 
analysis of ITG mechanisms in SMEs should take into 
account two main actors: the SME’s owner-manager, 
and its key employees. The level of trust between a 
SME and its external IT partners will moderate the 
need for the above-mentioned main actors to put in 
place elaborated ITG mechanisms. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
The preceding analysis shows that when analyzing ITG 
in SMEs, researchers need to take into account theories 
that are more appropriate for SMEs. Building on such 
theories as discussed in the precedent section we 
propose a conceptual framework of IT governance in 
SMEs, presented in Figure 1. In this framework, the 
SME’s owner-manager and key (internal) employees 
are the main actors. The inclusion of the SME’s owner-
manager characteristics in the conceptual framework of 
ITG in SMEs is based on upper echelon theory and 
stakeholder theory, which both acknowledge the 
SME’s owner-manager’s tight grip on any major 
organizational activities and decisions. Besides, the 
primary role played by owner-managers in the context 
of SMEs is unanimously acknowledged in the small 
business literature. The inclusion of the SME’s key 
employees is based on upper echelon theory as well: 
key employees’ influence is inversely proportional to 
the size of their organization, so the role of key 
employees in any major decisions would be greater in 
SMEs than in LEs.  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
of ITG in SMEs 
The proposed framework also assumes that in their 
decision with regard to ITG mechanisms, the SME’s
owner-manager and key employees will be to some 
extent influenced by its external links. This assumption 
is based concurrently on the resource-dependency 
theory, the institutional theory, and the theory of 
institutional trust. In accordance with the resource-
dependency theory, the access to external resources 
through either independent and outside directors or IT 
external partners would influence the SME’s owner-
manager and key employees with respect to their ITG 
decisions. According to institutional theory, mimetic,
normative, and coercive pressures would be exerted on 
the SME’s main actors towards the implementation of 
the same ITG mechanisms adopted by organizations 
evolving in the SME’s environment. As for the theory 
of institutional trust, it allows to take into account the 
moderating effect of trust between a SME and its IT 
external partners on the level of ITG mechanisms 
implementation: high levels of trust reduce the need for 
owner-managers and key employees to implement 
agency theory-inspired ITG mechanisms. 
So, the proposed conceptual framework is 
composed with five main groups of factors. At the 
center, there is the group of ITG mechanisms. Their 
adoption is directly or indirectly determined by three 
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groups of factors: the SME’s owner-manager’s 
characteristics, its key employees’ characteristics and 
its external links. IT business value, as the outcome of 
ITG mechanisms, is the last group. 
3.1. IT governance mechanisms in SMEs 
ITG literature generally classifies ITG mechanisms 
into three dimensions: structures, processes, and 
participants [49,50,51]. Sometimes, the last dimension 
is referred to as relational mechanisms [6,52,53]. The 
structure dimension emphasizes control and 
coordination and refers to the organization of IT 
function, to its roles and responsibilities, brief, to the 
formal and rational units and mechanisms put in place 
to carry out IT-related decisions and activities in 
organizations; structure refers to the locus of authority 
with regards to IT decision-making, in other words it 
determines who act and with which resources [49]. The 
processes dimension emphasizes control and 
sustainable capability, and refers to tools, techniques, 
frameworks or standards combined to ensure IT-
Business strategic alignment and to track IT 
performance achievements. The participants dimension 
refers to the persons at various levels and functions 
who take part in leadership, training and sharing, who 
actively participate, collaborate, communicate, and get 
involved in order to disseminate IT-related policies, 
principles and outcomes. 
Some highly-formalized IT governance 
mechanisms are less suitable to rather organic and 
loosely structured SMEs [13]. Basic ITG mechanisms 
are likely to be found in SMEs. These ITG 
mechanisms are not necessarily denaturing. Structure-
related ITG mechanisms such as CIO on board and IT 
steering committee [53] are less likely to be in place in 
SMEs, as their structural IT governance capability is 
likely to be assumed by the owner-manager. Clear IT-
related roles and responsibilities of the owner-manager 
are thus necessary as structural governance mechanism 
in this case [6]. Instead of the formal CIO function, a 
SME is likely to rely on an IT champion, a much more 
informal role and yet a very important one for its IT-
related activities [54]. SMEs may also rely on external 
expertise to compensate their lack of expertise 
internally. The IT champion will play a determinant 
role in the relationship between a SME and its IT 
external expert. 
For process-related mechanisms such as externally 
developed standards, tools, techniques, or frameworks 
like COBIT, ITIL, ISO17799 [51] which are highly 
formalized and certification oriented, SMEs are not 
either well equipped. Without necessary resorting to 
highly developed tools, SMEs have to find ways to 
align their IT projects to their strategic business and to 
track IT business value creation. Otherwise, 
overwhelmed by operational imperatives as they tend 
to be, SMEs may lose sight of long term and strategic 
imperatives in their IT decision-making. So, one would 
consider IT strategic alignment and IT performance 
tracking as key process-related IT governance 
mechanisms in SMEs. 
As for participants, relational mechanisms such as 
business/IT co-location and active participation and 
collaboration between key stakeholders do not need to 
be formally implemented in SMEs as they are naturally 
evident in such context [6]. However, for an effective 
collaboration between participants [55], people 
involved in IT governance need to develop mutual 
understanding which can be reached through IT 
training, and proper communication for developing 
awareness and understanding of business/IT objectives. 
3.2. Antecedents of ITG mechanisms 
In our framework, the adoption of ITG mechanisms is 
directly determined by both SME owner-manager’s
characteristics and key employees’ characteristics, and 
indirectly affected by SME’s external links. In other 
words, the relationship between, on one hand the 
owner-manager’s characteristics and the key 
employees’ characteristics, and on the other hand the 
adoption of ITG mechanisms is moderated by the 
SME’s external links. 
3.2.1 The SMEಬs owner-manager. Studies on SMEs 
have always acknowledged the central role of the 
entrepreneur or owner-manager in shaping the firm. As 
the principal stakeholder concurrently assuming 
multiple roles, he/she is involved in almost if not all 
major decisions that affect the firm for better or worse. 
His/her characteristics will then be determinant. 
Banking on previous studies, we put these 
characteristics in three main categories: IT-related 
competencies [56,57,58,59], interpersonal and 
management-related competencies [60,61], and 
personal values, beliefs, and norms [39,62]. 
IT-related competencies of an owner-manager are 
important in that they will shape not only his/her 
understanding of opportunities of IT usage in business 
activities, but also his or her expectations with regards 
to how IT activities should be managed. These 
understanding and expectations will lead to the IT 
adoption decision, and more important, to the creation 
of facilitating conditions for the actual IT 
implementation and use [58]. IT governance 
mechanisms can be viewed as facilitating conditions 
meant to leverage IT for achieving business goals. 
Interpersonal and management-related 
competencies will help the owner-manager to 
effectively communicate his/her vision of ITG 
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mechanisms, motivate and get employees to adhere to 
that vision, overcome change resistance, and meet the 
scope, time, and goal objectives throughout the 
implementation phases of ITG mechanisms. Adapting 
Kraemmergaard and Rose’s [61] and Bassellier and 
Benbasat’s [60] definitions to the context of ITG, we 
retain leadership, interpersonal communication, human 
resource, change management, and project 
management as part of interpersonal and management-
related competencies.  
Another determinant factor that would sway an 
owner-manager’s decision in favor or not of ITG 
mechanisms adoption is the level of compatibility 
between these mechanisms and his or her values, 
beliefs, and norms. The notion of compatibility, which 
refers to the perception of consistence of an innovation 
(ITG mechanisms in this case) with regards to values, 
experiences, beliefs, and needs of would-be adopters, 
is   important, especially in small firms [62]. Owner-
managers will obviously willingly push for adoption of 
ITG mechanisms that are compatible with their values, 
beliefs, and norms. 
Considering the precedent considerations, the 
following proposition can be stated: 
P1. Greater competencies (IT-related, interpersonal 
and management-related) of the SME’s owner-
manager and higher levels of perceived compatibility 
of his or her values, beliefs, and norms with ITG 
mechanisms will positively influence the 
implementation of ITG mechanisms in a SME. 
3.2.2 The SME’s key employees. Notwithstanding the 
key role of the entrepreneur or the owner-manager in 
all major decisions, key employees’ influence in SMEs 
is likely to be paramount. This major influence stems 
from the fact that small firms tend to be structured 
around key employees’ abilities and interests [13]. It is 
also due to the small size and organizational flexibility 
of SMEs [21] that do not restrict key employees in 
narrowly-defined roles. The paramount influence of the 
SMEs’ key employees is in line with the upper echelon 
theory [27]. The characteristics of a SME’s key 
employees have to be taken into consideration in order 
to understand the adoption of ITG mechanisms in the 
firm. Based on previous studies [61,63], these 
characteristics are grouped into three main categories: 
(1) IT technical skills, (2) business competencies, and 
(3) values, beliefs, and norms. 
At the level of key employees, IT technical skills 
required are more than a certain level of comfort with 
IT as is the case for owner-manager’s IT knowledge. 
IT technical skills of key employees are a reflection of 
their IT-related explicit knowledge with regards to 
technology, applications, system development, IT 
management, access to IT knowledge. IT technical 
skills also include their IT-related tacit knowledge, that 
is experience in IT projects and experience in the 
management of IT [63]. While owner-manager’s IT 
knowledge play a role in the decision to adopt IT, IT 
technical skills at  the key employees level are 
indispensable for the actual implementation and 
effective use of IT [29]. We would here assume the 
same pattern applies to ITG mechanisms adoption and 
implementation. 
So, for this study we define business competencies 
of key employees as the knowledge and skills of key 
employees of a SME related to their understanding the 
business domain and the specific organizational 
context. The business domain-specific competencies 
refer to the knowledge of the production system of a 
firm’s industry, the ability to recognize the firm’s
challenges and opportunities, including the potential of 
IT leverage for enhancing business processes. The 
organization-specific competencies are about the acute 
acquaintance of the firm’s functioning (e.g. power 
distribution, structures), specificities (e.g. culture and 
history), and partnership. Key employees with stronger 
business competencies (business domain-specific and 
organizational-specific) are more likely to better 
understand the potential of IT usage in business 
activities and the necessity to adopt ITG mechanisms 
for achieving higher IT business value.  
As in the case of owner-managers, values, beliefs, 
and norms of key employees of a SME will affect ITG 
mechanisms adoption. Shared cognitive characteristics 
(such as values, beliefs, and norms) will be conducive 
to consensus among team members which in turn will 
facilitate the introduction of strategic change in SMEs 
[21]. This can be seen as a positive factor for ITG 
mechanisms adoption. But according to institutional 
trust theory, shared values and norms may reduce the 
need of formalized mechanisms [4]. So, we would 
argue that shared values, beliefs, and norms among the 
SME’s key employees will accelerate the process of 
ITG mechanisms adoption (pace) while reducing the 
diversity of ITG mechanisms adopted. We would also 
argue that the SME’s key employees will favor the 
adoption of ITG mechanisms they deem compatible 
with their values, beliefs, and norms over others 
deemed less compatible.  
From the above developments, the two following 
propositions can be stated: 
P2. Greater competencies (IT technical skills, business 
competencies) of the SME’s key employees and higher 
levels of perceived compatibility of their values, 
beliefs, and norms with ITG mechanisms will 
positively influence the implementation of ITG 
mechanisms in a SME. 
P3. The more the values, beliefs, and norms are shared 
among a SME’s key employees, the more a SME will 
easily adopt and implement ITG mechanisms (quick 
pace), and the less diversified ITG mechanisms will be. 
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3.2.3. The SME’s external links. In SMEs, decisions 
are mainly made by the owner-manager assisted by key 
employees. However, in their decision-making process, 
they may be swayed one way or another by external 
stakeholders. Following the literature review, we 
retained three sources of influence that can affect the 
decision to adopt IT governance mechanisms: outside 
and independent directors, institutional pressures, and 
IT external partnership. 
We have already underscored that, in most SMEs, 
board of directors are either inexistent or purely 
formal, or sometimes used to serve the owner-
manager’s purposes [22,23,26]. Yet, in accordance 
with the resource-dependency theory, having a board 
on which sit a number of external directors increases a 
firm’s exposure to external environment networks and 
its convenient access to valuable resources [64]. The 
latter’s independence vis-à-vis the owner-manager (and 
key employees) gives them much more latitude in their 
supervision role of the firm’s management. So, SMEs 
are compelled to adopt boards with a great number of 
outside and independent directors [24]. This would 
prevent them from developing “a myopic and narrow 
view” that stall change [21, p. 299]. Outside and 
independent directors would influence owner-
managers and key employees towards ITG 
mechanisms adoption. 
Institutional theory [46] posits that changes in 
organizations are determined more by external or 
environmental pressures than “rational” decisions by 
internal actors (owner-managers and key employees). 
In accordance with the institutional perspective, it has 
been found that the diffusion of corporate social 
responsibilities in SMEs is linked to the extent at 
which these SMEs are embedded in a network of local 
socio-economic institutions [39]. Similarly, a SME’s
network ties will play a role in deciding the owner-
manager and key employees to embrace ITG 
mechanisms that are in place in other organizations 
within the network. Besides, inter-organizational 
exchanges entail task and function interdependence 
that requires a great deal of coordination [49]. 
Challenges related to the coordination of business 
partners which are more or less different with regard to 
various organizational aspects (strategy, processes, 
structure, IT infrastructure and architecture) incite each 
other to put in place governance mechanisms [49]. In 
the same vein, compared to the local SMEs, world-
class SMEs would need more IT governance 
mechanisms due to their being involved in more 
extended networks [65]. 
It is almost a truism to say that most SMEs lack 
internal IT expertise. To compensate this, they mainly 
rely on IT external expertise. Somehow, this 
dependence put a SME in a situation of inter-
organizational IT governance. Studying profiles of 
inter-organizational ITG, Croteau, Bergeron, and 
Dubsky [50, p. 36] proposed a continuum with at one 
end the contractual profile, and at the other, the 
consensual profile: in contractual profiles, 
“organizations are involved in a legal relationship with 
their outsourcers”, while consensual profiles are 
characterized by “a collaborative and cooperative 
approach”. Potential opportunistic behaviors are fought 
mainly through the formalization of commitments in 
contractual profiles, and through mutual trust in 
consensual profiles. Contractual profiles are consistent 
with agency theory according to which, as previously 
stated, a SME would adopt ITG mechanisms to deter 
opportunistic behavior from the external expert. We 
have seen however, in accordance with the theory of 
institutional trust, that some SMEs, ill-equipped for 
developing structured controls or outcome-based 
contracts, will instead seek a partnership based on trust 
[4]. So, an external partnership based on trust will 
reduce the need to resort to formalized IT governance 
mechanisms in SMEs. 
All these considerations related to the SME’s
external links lead to the following propositions: 
P4. A SME’s external links through outside and 
independent directors, networks, and IT partners will 
have a positive impact on the owner-manager’s and 
key employees’ decision to adopt ITG mechanisms. 
P5. The higher the level of institutional trust between a 
SME and its IT external partner, the less its owner-
manager and key employees will be swayed towards 
ITG mechanisms adoption. 
3.3. Consequences of ITG mechanisms 
It has been suggested that there may be a positive 
correlation between ITG mechanisms and different 
organizational performance measures as captured into 
Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard framework 
[52]. Bradley et al. [66] have established that ITG has a 
positive impact on different measures of hospital 
performance. The underlying assumption is that 
effective IT governance would enhance IT impacts on 
the organizational performance. 
The idea that the ultimate effectiveness of ITG 
mechanisms adopted in organizations should be 
appreciated in terms of IT contribution to business 
value (IT business value) seems to be a largely shared 
understanding in ITG literature [3]. IT business value 
is defined as “the organizational performance impacts 
of information technology at both the intermediate 
process level and the organization-wide level, and 
comprising both efficiency impacts and competitive 
impacts’’ [67, p. 287]. More precisely, Weill and Ross 
[44, p. 26] suggested assessing the ITG effectiveness 
against the achievement of four IT-enabled 
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organizational objectives: “cost-effectiveness, asset 
utilization, business growth and business flexibility”.
As the effectiveness of IT initiatives and 
investments is one of the priorities of ITG [66], any 
failure with regards to IT initiatives hints to the failure 
of ITG. For example, failure of outsourced information 
systems may be seen as a failure of ITG [4]. In the 
same way, the under-exploitation of IT business value 
in SMEs [6] can be blamed on weaknesses of their 
ITG. So, the adoption of ITG mechanisms may have a 
positive impact on IT business value in SMEs, hence 
the following proposition: 
P6. The adoption of IT governance mechanisms in a 
SME will improve its IT business value. 
3.4. Control variables: size, sector, and age 
We previously underscored the necessity of carefully 
considering the heterogeneous nature of SMEs. All of 
these enterprises share some particularities, but they 
may also present some differences due to their size 
(very small-, small-, medium-sized), industry sector, or 
their age. All these factors are taken into account in the 
proposed research framework as control variables. 
The size of firms (in terms of the number of 
employees or in terms of revenues) is generally 
positively associated with the adoption of innovations 
[68, 69]. More precisely, in the field of ITG, it has 
been advanced that there may be a positive correlation 
between the firm's size and ITG effectiveness [52]. The 
same authors posit that organizations operating in 
information intensive sectors or in sectors 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty are more 
likely to effectively implement ITG mechanisms than 
organizations in less information intensive sectors, or 
in less uncertain environments. The firm's age can also 
explain differences between SMEs with regard to ITG 
mechanisms adoption. After reporting mixed results in 
literature on this topic, Mohamed et al. [52] formulate 
the hypothesis that a firm's age would be negatively 
correlated with ITG effectiveness. 
4. Conclusion 
Theories and frameworks generally referred to in the 
field of CG in general, and in ITG in particular, have 
mainly been developed in the context of large 
enterprises. In this study we analyzed the main theories 
applied in CG and ITG research, and confronted them 
with the specificities of SMEs. This confrontation 
allowed us to highlight the limits of these theories in 
the SME’s context, and to discuss adaptations needed 
or alternative theories in such context. Building on 
these developments, we then proposed a conceptual 
framework of ITG in SMEs.  
We have shown that the mainstream agency theory 
does not fare well when applied in the context of 
SMEs. So, the proposed conceptual framework is 
based on a combination of alternative theories: upper 
echelon theory, stakeholder theory, resource-
dependence theory, institutional theory, and the theory 
of institutional trust. In accordance with the now 
abundant literature on SMEs, the conceptual 
framework acknowledges the central role played by the 
owner-manager in all major decisions of the firm. In 
accordance with the upper echelon theory, the role of 
the SME’s key employees (or the top-management 
team) is also acknowledged in the conceptual 
framework proposed. Together, resource-dependency 
theory, the institutional theory and the theory of 
institutional trust have been referred to for propositions 
related to the role of the SME’s external links in its 
decision towards ITG mechanisms adoption.  
In taking the SME's specificities into account, we 
followed the previous research recommendation that 
size is one of the contingencies that must be heeded 
when designing a mix of structures, processes, and 
relational mechanisms for an IT governance 
framework [54]. The six propositions presented in this 
paper may thus serve as initial hypotheses for 
empirical verification. This conceptual paper is a first 
step in our research. In the next step, case studies will 
be conducted to refine the conceptual framework, 
followed by a survey to test the framework..
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